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The ultimate testimonial act that a person may perform is to
bequeath all of the economic and property interests that he has
acquired during his lifetime.' The law of succession developed
to govern the orderly transfer of those interests from one generation to the next generation. 2 When a person devises his property
I See Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and
Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340 (1966). The transfer of property at death according
to a fixed scheme of disposition is forced succession. Id. at 352. The general rule
with respect to forced succession is that a testator may dispbse of his property
through a will in any way he pleases pursuant to freedom of testation. Id. at 354-55.
Professor Friedman stated that the principle of forced succession is social in nature.
Id. at 353. Therefore, he proffered:
Practically speaking, forced succession means succession within the family to the wife, children, or other dependents. Forced succession imposes upon the testator the obligation to care for members of his family
before satisfying any other desires and needs. In a sense, it converts
private property at death to family property. The unit under . . . the
principle of forced succession . . . is the nuclear family, the basis of
American kinship and social custom.
Id.
2 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 340. A major way in which social order transcends time is through the inheritance of interests in property. Id.
Restraints placed on disposition of land by the feudal system lead to the development of the use, which evolved into the primary means by which a person would
devise his property. Nelson & Stark, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at the
Execution of Wills, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331, 333-34 (1979). With the enactment of
the Statute of Uses in 1535, the equitable estate held by the cestui que use merged
with the legal estate of the feoffee and thereby created a single legal estate in the
beneficiary of the use. Id. The Statute of Uses, which was created as a revenue
raising device by King Henry VIII, served as the impetus for the enactment of the
Statute of Wills of 1540. Id. Overwhelmingly representing the desire of the populace to possess the freedom to devise property, the Statute of Wills of 1540 enabled
one to devise presently acquired real property by a writing. Id. at 335-36.
The Statute was so broad it allowed persons lacking in capacity to dispose of real property ....
The writing requirement was not needed to
provide evidence of the testator's intent, but to evidence the conveyance. Consequently, the Statute did not require that the writing be in
the hand of the testator nor that it be signed by him. Thus, it can be
seen that the purposes underlying the writing requirement of the Statute of Wills of 1540 had little in common with those allegedly furthered
by modern will formalities.
Id. at 336-37. In contrast to real property, personalty passed primarily by nuncupative will. Id. at 337. The Statute of Frauds of 1677, considered to be the precursor
of modern wills acts, altered these trends. See id. at 340.
Since the Statute of Frauds made it practically impossible to make a ver-
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by a writing, described as his last will and testament, and executes the document in the presence of witnesses, its validity is
inevitably controlled by the Wills Act. 3 It seems apparent that a
legal institution that grants a person the power to choose his successors in ownership should rigorously promote the general philosophy of giving effect to the intentional exercise of that power.4
The law, however, is notorious for voiding a will because of a
minute defect in formality, irrespective of an abundance of evidence of testamentary intent.5 In the recent case of In re Estate of
bal will, written wills of real and personal property came into general
use; nuncupative wills became rare. The problems next presented to
the courts were not fraudulent assertions of oral wills, but cases wherein
the formalities of the Statute of Frauds were not met.
Id.
3 Gulliver & Tilson, Classificationof Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941).
4 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 3, at 2. Gulliver and Tilson commented that

constant emphasis on the intent of the transferor is necessary because inordinate
preoccupation with dialectic or detail may cause such intent to become obscured or
neglected. Id.
A court absorbed in purely doctrinal arguments may lose sight of the
important and desirable objective of sanctioning what the transferor
wanted to do, even though it is convinced that he wanted to do it.
If this objective is primary, the requirements of execution, which
concern only the form of the transfer-what the transferor or others
must do to make it legally effective-seem justifiable only as implements
for its accomplishment, and should be so interpreted by the courts in
these cases. They surely should not be revered as ends in themselves,
enthroning formality over frustrated intent.
Id. at 2-3.
5 See Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1975). See, e.g., Heise v. Earle, 134 N.J. Eq. 393, 35 A.2d 880 (1943) (testator's
destruction of subsequent will which revoked all prior wills caused her to die intestate because such act was not sufficient to re-establish former will); In re Amsden,
121 N.J. Eq. 571, 191 A. 801 (1937) (will denied admission to probate because
insufficient evidence to prove that testator acknowledged signature in presence of
two witnesses); Lacey v. Dobbs, 63 N.J. Eq. 325, 50 A. 497 (1901) (testator's act of
affixing signature to document subsequent to witnesses signing document constitutes improper declaration of will); In re Abbott's Estate, I N.J. Super. 298, 64 A.2d
246 (App. Div. 1949) (probate denied for want of due execution when testimony
concerning subscribing witnesses was insufficient to show that will containing defective attestation clause was published in presence of two witnesses present at
same time); In re Estate of Cunningham, 198 N.J. Super. 484, 487 A.2d 777 (Law
Div. 1984) (testator's signature was not properly acknowledged when second witness subscribed instrument in testator's presence without knowledge that instrument was testator's last will and testament); In re DiPersia, 9 N.J. Super. 576, 75
A.2d 833 (Ch. Div. 1950) (will executed in Italy, where witnesses signed a packet
attesting receipt and delivery of will to notary, but did not sign the will itself, was
insufficient compliance with requirements necessary for attestation of will); In re
Johnson, 115 N.J. Eq. 249, 171 A. 307 (Prerog. Ct. 1934) (will denied admission to
probate because attestation clause failed to declare instrument to be testator's last
will and testament); In re Van Handlyn's Will, 83 N.J. Eq. 290, 89 A. 1010 (Prerog.
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Peters,6 the court denied a will admission to probate for the failure
of a witness to subscribe the instrument within a reasonable time
after the testator's execution, when there was obvious testamentary intent and no allegation of fraud. 7
After suffering a stroke in December 1983, Conrad Peters
entered the hospital for treatment." Although the stroke left Peters physically disabled, his mental capacities were not affected. 9
In mid-December of 1983, Peters and his wife discussed the need
to prepare their wills.' 0 At his wife's request, his sister-in-law, an
insurance agent, prepared identical wills for each of them."
Both wills named the surviving spouse as executor and provided
that Joseph Skrok, Peters' step-son,' 2 would be the alternate executor. 13 The wills similarly provided that the entire estate be
distributed to the surviving spouse, after payment of funeral expenses and debts, and named Joseph Skrok as the alternate
beneficiary. "
On December 30, 1983, Peters met his sister-in-law in the
hospital where she presented him with the will that she had prepared for him. 1 5 Peters listened as she read the provisions of the
Ct. 1913) (will not executed in compliance with statute with respect to publication
when two of three witnesses to alleged will did not know that instrument was intended as a will); Ludlow v. Ludlow, 35 NJ. Eq. 480 (Prerog. Ct. 1882), aff'd, 36
NJ. Eq. 597 (1883) (will denied admission to probate when one witness was asked
to be a witness after the document had been signed out of his presence and when
he did not hear acknowledgment of testator's signature); In re Gertrude Rice
McElwaine, 18 NJ. Eq. 499 (Prerog. Ct. 1867) (failure of testatrix to acknowledge
making of her signature by third party, when same was done at her direction and in
her presence was not in compliance with statute).
6 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987).
7 See id. at 282-83, 526 A.2d at 1015.
8 Id. at 266, 526 A.2d at 1006.
9 Id. at 267, 526 A.2d at 1007. The state did not question the testator's competency to devise a will. Id.
10 Id. Conrad Peters married Marie Skrok (formerly Gall) on June 8, 1946. In re
Estate of Peters, 210 N.J. Super. 295, 297, 509 A.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 1986),
aff'd, 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987).
11 Peters, 107 N.J. at 267, 526 A.2d at 1006-07. Sophia M. Gall is the sister of
Marie Peters and is also a notary public. Id.
12 Marie Peters was a widow prior to her marriage to Conrad Peters and bore
one child, Joseph Skrok, by the previous marriage. Peters, 210 N.J. Super. at 297,
509 A.2d at 798. Conrad Peters never adopted Joseph Skrok. Id.
13 Peters, 107 N.J. at 267, 526 A.2d at 1007.
14

Id.

15 Id. at 267, 526 A.2d at 1007. Conrad Peters was recovering in the hospital

when the will was presented to him. Id. The testator's wife and brother-in-law
were also present at this time. Id.
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will and he assented to the will before signing it.'

6

Peters' wife

and sister-in-law did not serve as witnesses to the execution because his sister-in-law had arranged
for two employees from her
7
office to serve as witnesses.'
Upon the arrival of the intended witnesses, Peters' sister-inlaw again reviewed the provisions of the will with the testator. 18
The testator again assented to the will and then acknowledged
his signature in the presence of the intended witnesses. 19 His sister-in-law subsequently notarized the document and handed it
over to Peters' wife.2 0 The intended witnesses, however, never
affixed their signatures to the will. 2 1 On March 28, 1985, the tes-

tator died and the will he executed fifteen months22earlier still remained unsigned by the two intended witnesses.
Joseph Skrok, the alternate beneficiary, 3 instituted suit in
the surrogate's court, offering the will executed by the testator
on December 30, 1983 for probate. 24 The surrogate's court denied the proffered instrument admission to probate because it
lacked the signatures of two witnesses.2 5
16 Id. Testator's wife, brother-in-law and sister-in-law observed the testator sign
the will. Peters, 210 N.J. Super. at 298, 509 A.2d at 798.
17 Peters, 107 N.J. at 267, 526 A.2d at 1007.
18 Id.

19 Id.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Marie Peters died intestate on March 23, 1985, approximately 126 hours
before Conrad Peters. Id. at 266, 526 A.2d at 1006. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-1 (West
1983) provides that for purposes of intestate succession, "[any person who fails to
survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased the decedent."
Id. Should Conrad Peters have died six hours earlier, he would be considered to
have predeceased his wife and her property would pass on to Skrok by intestacy.
See Peters, 107 N.J. at 266, 526 A.2d at 1006 n.1.
24 Id. at 265-66, 526 A.2d at 1006.
25 Id. at 266, 526 A.2d at 1006. Ms. Gall's testimony at the probate proceeding
revealed why the intended witnesses failed to sign the will. Id. She explained:
As I say, just because of the emotional aspect of the whole situation, my
sister-in-law was there, my husband, her brother was there, myself and
the two girls. There were six of us. The other patients had visitors. It
got to be kind of-I don't known [sic] how to explain it, just the situation, and the girls were in a hurry to get back to the office, because they
had to leave the office.
Id. at 268, 526 A.2d at 1007. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2 (West 1983) provides that:
Except as provided in [the holographic wills statute] every will shall be
in writing, signed by the testator or in his name by some other person in
his presence and at his direction, and shall be signed by at least two
persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will.
20
21
22
23
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Joseph Skrok subsequently commenced an action in the New
Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Probate Part, seeking the
admission to probate of the testator's will which had been denied
admission in the surrogate's court.2 6 The trial court found that
since the proffered will was signed by the testator in the presence
of two witnesses, it should be considered "properly executed. 2 7
The trial court also found that the notary's signature may be considered a subscribing witness and that the probate action could
proceed as if one witness died and the testimony of the surviving
witness was being used to prove the proffered instrument. 28 The
trial court then reasoned that the failure of the witness to sign the
will may be considered a mere "quirk" and that it should not
frustrate the decedent's obvious testamentary intent. 29 Accordingly, the trial court found that when the alternative would be for
the estate to escheat to the state,30 it is within its "equitable powers" to order that a second witness be permitted to sign the
document.3
Reversing the trial court decision and remanding the matter
for entry of a judgment in favor of the state, the appellate division indicated that it is not within a court's equitable powers to
excuse deficiencies in a will which do not meet statutory require26 In re Estate of Peters, 210 NJ. Super 295, 299, 509 A.2d 797, 799 (App. Div.
1986), aff'd, 107 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987). Skrok sought an order which would
permit a second witness to sign the will and which would also admit the will to
probate. Id.
27 Peters, 107 N.J. at 268, 526 A.2d at 1007.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-5 provides "[i]f there are none who may inherit an
intestate estate that estate shall escheat to the State." Id. The identity and location of any of the testator's next-of-kin is unknown. Peters, 210 N.J. Super. at 297,
509 A.2d at 798.
31 Peters, 107 NJ. at 268-69, 526 A.2d at 1007-08. The trial court admitted the
proffered will to probate upon the condition that one of the non-signing witnesses
ultimately subscribe the instrument and additionally submit an affidavit attesting to
"presence at the time of execution." Peters, 210 N.J. Super. at 299, 509 A.2d at 799.
Joseph Skrok subsequently refiled a complaint with the surrogate court offering the
will, now subscribed by another witness, for probate. Peters, 107 N.J. at 269, 526
A.2d at 1008. Based on the refiled complaint and affidavit of one of the non-subscribing witnesses, the surrogate court issued letters testamentary to Skrok, the testator's step-son, on September 3, 1987. Peters, 210 N.J. Super. at 299, 509 A.2d at
799.
The State sought appellate review of the trial court's decision. Id. The state
contended that the trial court erred in admitting the will to probate because it failed
to meet the statutory formalities concerning execution and also that the prevention
of an escheat to the state was the sole motivation for the ruling. Id.
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ments.3 2 The appellate division noted that enforcing such equitable principles would essentially avoid the obvious purpose of
the statute. 3 While recognizing that New Jersey case law indicates that strict compliance with the Wills Act is necessary to validate a will, 34 the appellate division noted that the 1978 revision
of the Wills Act merely reduced the number of minimum statutory requirements necessary to execute a will and did not suggest
any liberalization of compliance with those requirements that remained. 3 5 Relying on contradictory statements offered by the
witnesses and the failure to adequately explain the reason for the
failure of the intended witnesses to subsequently subscribe the
will, 36 the appellate division concluded that the evidence
presented could not support the conclusion reached by the trial
court regardless of whether the substantial compliance doctrine
or principles of equity were applied.3 7
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Simpson argued that there
are no statutory provisions which preclude allowing a witness to
subscribe a will after the testator's death.3 8 Accordingly, the dissenting judge argued that the proffered will substantially complied with the statute and should be admitted to probate.3 9
As a result of the dissenting opinion in the appellate division, Skrok was entitled to appeal the matter to the New Jersey
Supreme Court.4 ° Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous
court, affirmed the appellate court's decision 4 stating that strict
compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary under
most situations in order for a will to be valid regardless of
whether there are any indications of fraud. 42 The supreme court
also recognized that a witness may subscribe a will after the testator's death under certain circumstances, but refused to admit the
testator's will to probate in the present case, noting that such cirPeters, 219 NJ. Super. at 303, 509 A.2d at 801.
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Cosman, 193 N.J. Super. 664, 671, 475 A.2d 659,
661 (App. Div. 1984)).
34 Id. at 301, 509 A.2d at 800.
35 Id. at 304, 509 A.2d at 802.
36 Id. at 308, 509 A.2d at 804-05.
37 Id. at 308-09, 509 A.2d at 804-05.
38 Id. at 311-12, 509 A.2d at 806 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 312, 509 A.2d at 806 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
40 Peters, 107 N.J. at 265, 526 A.2d at 1006. The Court Rules of NewJersey provided that "[aippeals may be taken to the Supreme Court from final judgments as
of right . . . in cases where, and with regard to those issues as to which, there is a
dissent in the Appellate Division." N.J. R. Civ. P. 2:2-1 (a)(2).
41 Peters, 107 N.J. at 283, 526 A.2d at 1015.
42 Id. at 281-82, 526 A.2d at 1014-15.
32

33
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cumstances were not present.43
The analysis employed by the New Jersey judiciary when reviewing adherence to the formalities required to validly execute a
will has remained virtually unchanged throughout the life of the
Wills Act. Any defect in formality of execution, regardless of its
significance, has traditionally been held to void the will. 4 4 The

recognized function of these formalities is to assure that a decedent's estate is actually distributed according to the decedent's
intention.45
In 1858, the New Jersey Prerogative Court decided Mundy v.
Mundy, 4 6 a landmark case defining the acts constituting a satisfactory declaration as well as emphasizing the weight to be given to
a will which meets the statutory requirements for valid execution. 47 In Mundy, proponents challenged the validity of a will
containing an attestation clause showing that all statutory requirements of execution were fulfilled.4 ' Allegations of noncompliance with the wills statute focused on the acts constituting
the declaration.49 In attempting to demonstrate that there was
not a proper declaration by the testator despite language of the
attestation clause indicating the contrary, the proponents elicited
testimony from a witness to the execution which revealed that
her recollection of the particulars of the transaction was confused
and imperfect.50 The attestation clause with proper witnesses'
signatures is "primafacie evidence of the facts stated" and that an
"instrument ought not be rejected on account of" a witness's
mere want of recollection.5 In admitting the will to probate, the

court noted that a declaration by the testator to the effect that the
43 Id. at 283, 526 A.2d at 1015.
44 See Langbein, supra note 5, at 489. Professor Langbein states that "[t]he most

minute defect in formal compliance is held to void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was inconsequential." Id. He went on to explain
that Anglo-American courts have unanimously determined that an attempted will
fails if it has a defect in the execution. Id. See also Murray v. Lewis, 94 N.J. Eq. 681,
684, 121 A. 525, 526-27 (Ch. Div. 1923) (holding that an unattested document
disposing of property may not be incorporated by reference into a will).
45 See Langbein, supra note 5, at 492.
46 15 N.J. Eq. 290 (Prerog. Ct. 1858).
Id.
48 Id. at 292-93. The attestation to the will states: "Signed, sealed, published,
47

pronounced, and declared by the said Michael Mundy to be his last will and testament, in the presence of us," and is followed by the signatures of three witnesses.
Id. at 292.
49 Id. at 293-94.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 293. The Mundy court posited that when there is no attestation clause
there must be affirmative proof of publication and other requisites, "whereas when
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instrument was his last will and testament need not be made by
words but may be made by "any act or sign. "52
Twenty-four years after deciding Mundy, the New Jersey Prerogative Court waivered in its strict interpretation of the Wills
Act. 53 In Ludlow v. Ludlow, 54 the court once again considered the

legality of the execution of a will with regard to publication.5 5
Proponents challenged admission to probate of the testator's will
on the ground that the instrument was not properly published in
accordance with the governing statute. 56 The court noted that
four elements are required to validly execute a will. 57 Although

the court noted that it must be careful not to depart from the
plain requirements of the statutory language, 5 8 it "heartily" approved the principle which recognizes that substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient. 59 The court, however,
neglected to admit the will to probate under the substantial compliance doctrine because it found no proof of a proper
declaration.60
Subsequent decisions sharply criticized the notion of substantial compliance with the Wills Act and espoused the more
there is a perfect attestation clause there must be affirmative proof of the want of
those requirements." Id. (citations omitted).
52 Id. at 293-94. The court opined that a declaration by the scrivener in the
presence of the testator that "this is the will of [the testator], and he desires you to
witness it" would constitute a sufficient declaration. Id. at 294.
53 See Ludlow v. Ludlow, 35 N.J. Eq. 480 (Prerog. Ct. 1882), aff'd, 36 N.J. Eq.
597 (1883).
54 35 N.J. Eq. 480 (Prerog. Ct. 1882), aff'd, 36 N.J. Eq. 597 (1883).
55 Id. at 481.
56 See id. at 480-84. The testator's brother asked a person to act as a witness to
testator's will; however, the testator never acknowledged his signature in the presence of the witness. Id.
57 Id. at 487-88. The court stated:
Four things are required, first, that the will shall be in writing; secondly,
that it shall be signed by the testator; thirdly, that such signature shall be
made by the testator, or the making thereof acknowledged by him in the
presence of two witnesses; fourthly, that it shall be declared to be his
last will and testament in the presence of those witnesses.
Id. (quoting In re McElwaine, 18 N.J. Eq. 499 (Prerog. Ct. 1867)).
58 Id. at 488 (citing In re McElwaine, 18 N.J. Eq. 499, 501 (Prerog. Ct. 1867)).
59 Id. at 489 (citing Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N.Y. 125 (1873)); Baskin v. Baskin, 36
N.Y. 416 (1867) (holding that when a testator produces a paper with his signature
and asks persons to witness it and declares the paper to be his will, all statutory
requirements are met and the testator substantially acknowledged his signature).
In Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N.J. Eq. 597 (1883), the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ordinary; however, it remarked that "the better and safer rule is to require a literal construction of the statute in regard to the
publication." Id. at 600 (citations omitted).
6o) Ludlow, 35 N.J. Eq. at 489.
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traditional standard of strict interpretation. 6 ' In 1956, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in In re Hale's
Will 6 2 when it posited that "a literal construction of the statute
with regard to the formal requisites" is necessary and "anything
short of positive proof of conformity with the statutory requirements" is unacceptable. 63 In Hale, proponents argued that the
proffered instrument was not properly executed since the testator did not declare it to be his last will and testament in the presence of the witness and did not request the witness to subscribe
in that capacity. 64 To determine whether the acts performed constituted literal compliance with regard to the publication requirement, the court recited the purposes for the statutory formalities
and examined them in conjunction with acts performed. 65 Analyzed against these well-known principles, the court denied the
will admission to probate because it found that it was not published in strict compliance with the statute.6 6
Thereafter, in In re Petkos,6 7 the appellate division applied the
principles enunciated in Hale when it posited that a will may be
admitted to probate despite its defective attestation clause. 68
The controversy surrounding the proffered instrument focused
on the "absence of proof of any objective action by the testator
during the episode of execution and witnessing of the will" which
would indicate that the testator acquiesced in the declaration by
61 See In re Amsden, 121 NJ. Eq. 571, 574, 191 A. 801, 803 (1937) ("[T]he rule
is that the court has no right to substitute conjecture for positive proof of conformity to the statutory requirements."); In re Taylor, 28 N.J. Super. 220, 225, 100 A.2d
346, 348 (App. Div. 1953) (holding that the principle of substantial compliance
with the Wills Act is not as safe a rule to follow as is literal construction); In re
Johnson, 115 N.J. Eq. 249, 254, 171 A. 307, 310 (1934) (Prerog. Ct. 1934) ("[T]he
better and safer rule is to require a literal construction of the statute in regard to
the publication." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N.J. Eq. 597,
600 (1883)).
62 21 NJ. 284, 121 A.2d 511 (1956).
63 Id. at 295, 121 A.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
64 See id., 121 A.2d at 517-18.
65 See id. at 296-98, 121 A.2d at 518-19. The court stated:
The effect of these requirements is to insure knowledge by the testator
that his solemn act is a testamentary disposition of his bounty. It forestalls fraud by the living upon the dead; it tends to discourage imposition upon the unwary; and it gives to the person who is being compelled
consciously against his will an opportunity to cry out.
Id. at 297, 121 A.2d at 519.
66 Id. at 298, 121 A.2d at 519.
67 54 N.J. Super. 118, 148 A.2d 320 (App. Div. 1959).
68 See id. The attestation clause was defective because it omitted reference to the
instrument as being the testator's last will and testament. Id. at 120, 148 A.2d at
321.
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one witness that the instrument was the testator's last will and
testament and that he desired the other witness to subscribe the
instrument in that capacity.6 9 The court relied on concepts set
forth in Mundy when it noted that an expression by the scrivener
in the presence of the testator and witnesses that the document
about to be signed is the testator's last will and testament would
"suffice as a statutory declaration without any further objective
indicium of concurrence by the testator" other than his signature
in the presence of the witnesses.70 The court reasoned that to
require the testator to perform an affirmative act or other objective manifestation as a mandatory prerequisite for a valid declaration would "come close to substituting a fetish for a rule of
reason." 7 ' Admitting the proffered instrument to probate, the
court found that there was "clear and positive proof" of a publication of the instrument in accordance with the statutory
framework. 2
In the case of In re Estate of Saenger,73 the judiciary was asked
to consider whether a will containing a perfect attestation clause
may be probated with proof of only one witness's signature. 4
The proffered instrument contained the signatures of the decedent and two witnesses; however, one witness died and the other
was found unattainable after a diligent search. 75 The former law
partner of the deceased witness proved his signature.7 6 The
court noted that the issue was not whether proof of compliance
with the Wills Act should be relaxed,7 7 but rather whether sufficient evidence was presented to require that probate should be
granted.78 In analyzing the rules concerning proof necessary to
probate a will, the court based its conclusion upon the rules of
evidence which provide that an attestation clause is an exception
to the hearsay rule. 79 The court posited that when there is a per69 Id.
70 Id. at 122-23, 148 A.2d at 321. But see Inre Hale's Will, 21 N.J. 284, 296, 121
A.2d 511, 518 (1956); In re Abbot's Estate, 1 N.J. Super. 298, 300, 64 A.2d 246, 247
(App. Div. 1949).
71 Petkos, 54 N.J. Super. at 124, 148 A.2d at 323. The court theorized that to
require more would not serve justice or fulfill the salutary purpose of the statute.
Id. at 125, 148 A.2d at 324.
72 Id. at 125, 148 A.2d at 324.
73 133 N.J. Super. 151, 335 A.2d 601 (Law Div. 1975).
74 Id. at 154, 335 A.2d at 602.
75 Id. at 153, 335 A.2d at 602.
76 Id.
77 See id.at 154-55, 335 A.2d at 602-03.
78 Id. at 154, 335 A.2d at 602.
79 Id. at 157, 335 A.2d at 604. N.J. R. EvID. 63(29) provides:
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fect attestation clause to a will, and the whereabouts of one witness is diligently unknown, proof of a deceased witness's
signature carries with it proof that he observed the other unobtainable witness subscribe the instrument. 80 The court further
stated that proof of one witness's signature, where both witnesses
are unavailable, is proof that the testator complied with all the
necessary requirements for valid execution.8 l Accordingly, the
court found sufficient evidence existed and admitted the proffered instrument to probate.8 2
In 1978, the New Jersey Legislature revised the Wills Act,
modeling the new statute after the Uniform Probate Code. 3
Shortly thereafter, in 1980, in In re Estate of Fernandez, 4 proponents challenged the validity of two wills, alleging that they were
not published and witnessed in accordance with the statutory formalities.8 5 In Fernandez, the witnesses were summoned to come
86
into the testators' home to witness the execution of the wills.
Controversy existed, however, as to whether the testators actu8 7
ally declared the instruments to be their last will and testament.
While the court noted that there was an increased discussion of
88
substantial compliance with the Wills Act amongst authorities,
it found that the proffered instruments lacked precise compliance
A statement contained in a conveyance, assignment, will, or other instrument purporting to affect an interest in property is admissible to
prove the truth of the matter stated if the matter would be relevant to an
issue which involved an interest in that property and if dealings with the
property since the instrument was made have not been inconsistent with
the truth of the statement or the purport of the instrument.
Id. See 5J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1505 (1974) (describing the theory
of the exception of an attestation of a subscribing witness).
80 Saenger, 133 N.J. Super. at 159-60, 335 A.2d at 605-06.
81 Id. at 160, 335 A.2d at 605-06. See also 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 79, at § 1511
(when attestor's signature is proven, all elements of due execution are implied).
The court determined that to reason otherwise would "come close to substituting a
fetish for a rule of reason." Saenger, 133 N.J. Super. at 160, 335 A.2d at 606 (citing
In re Petkos, 54 N.J. Super. 118, 124, 148 A.2d at 320, 324 (App. Div. 1959)).
82 Saenger, 133 N.J. Super. at 159, 335 A.2d at 605. Cf. Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N.J.
Eq. 290 (Prerog. Ct. 1858) (perfect attestation clause prevails over defective memory); James v. Wendhack, I N.J. Super. 203, 63 A.2d 710 (App. Div. 1949), certif.
denied, 1 N.J. 603 (1949) (perfect attestation clause prevails over contradictory testimony of witnesses).
83 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969).
84 173 N.J. Super. 240, 413 A.2d 998 (Law Div. 1980).
85 Id. at 242, 413 A.2d at 999.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 242-43, 413 A.2d at 999-1000.
88 Id. at 244-45, 413 A.2d at 1000-01. See also T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 293
(2d ed. 1953); Langbein, supra note 5, at 489; 2 PAGE, LAw OF WILLS § 19.4 (Bowe
& Parker ed. 1960).
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with the former statute8 9 and refrained from admitting the wills
to probate pursuant to the substantial compliance doctrine. 90
The court noted, however, that the new statute diminishes the
formal requirements necessary to execute a will9' and observed
that the alleged violations were not requirements for valid execution under the new statute.9 2 Finding the "new statute which di93
minishes the requirements for will execution . . .controlling,
the court determined that it was unnecessary to decide whether
the controversial doctrine of substantial compliance would be
sufficient under either statute. 94 Accordingly, the court admitted
the wills to probate. 95
Four years later, in In re Estate of Cunningham,9 6 proponents
challenged the validity of a form will where several clauses, including the attestation clause, were printed with the remaining
89 See Fernandez, 173 N.J. Super. at 245, 413 A.2d at 1001; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 3A:3-2 (West 1953) (repealed 1983) (which requires the testator to declare the
writing to be his last will and testament in the presence of both witnesses present at
the same time).
90 Fernandez, 173 N.J. Super. at 245, 413 A.2d at 1001. Judge Yanoff commented
that "were I to rule that the wills be admitted to probate because of substantial
compliance with the Wills Act, I would be breaking new ground, a role more appropriate to appellate courts." Id.
91 Id. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1982). The general comment to this section states:
The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been reduced to a
minimum. Execution under this section normally would be accomplished by signature of the testator and of two witnesses; each of the
persons signing as witnesses must "witness" any of the following: the
signing of the will by the testator, an acknowledgment by the testator
that the signature is his, or an acknowledgment by the testator that the
document is his will .... There is no requirement that the testator publish the document as his will, or that he request the witnesses to sign, or
that the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator or of each other.
The testator may sign the will outside the presence of the witnesses if he
later acknowledges to the witnesses that the signature is his or that the
document is his will, and they sign as witnesses. There is no requirement that the testator's signature be at the end of the will; thus, if he
writes his name in the body of the will and intends it to be his signature,
this would satisfy the statute. The intent is to validate wills which meet
the minimal formalities of the statute.
Id.
92 Fernandez, 173 N.J. Super. at 245, 413 A.2d at 1001.
93 Id. at 248, 413 A.2d at 1003. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 8-101 (b)(l) (1982)
(stating that the Code applies to the will of any decedent dying after the effective
date thereof). NewJersey, however, did not incorporate the aforesaid section into
the Wills Act. Fernandez, 173 N.J. Super. at 246, 413 A.2d at 1001.
94 See Fernandez, 173 N.J. Super at 248, 413 A.2d 1002.
95 Id.
96 198 N.J. Super. 484, 487 A.2d 777 (Law Div. 1984).
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portions handwritten by the testator.97 The first paragraph of the
instrument contained the testator's printed signature; however,
the testator neglected to subscribe the will elsewhere and the signature line at the foot of the document contained a notary public's signature and seal. 9 8 Relying on a comment to section 2-502
of the Uniform Probate Code, 9 9 the court determined that the
legislature intended that the testator need not subscribe in any
specific place so long as he intended "his written name to constitute his signature."' 0 0 Although the court concluded that the testator "signed" the will, it declined to admit the instrument to
probate because the testimony of the two subscribing witnesses
disclosed that the signature was not acknowledged in accordance
with the statutory formalities.' 0 ' The court suggested that the
testator's request of the notary public to sign the "fully completed" instrument as a witness constituted an acknowledgement,
but that there was no acknowledgement with respect to the other
witness because the testator had failed to request her to sign the
02
instrument. 1
Because statutes modeled after the Uniform Probate Code
do not require a witness to subscribe a will in the testator's presence, 10 3 controversy exists as to the period of time in which the
witness may validly subscribe a will. More specifically, litigation
has recently centered on a witness's ability to sign a will after the
testator's death.'0 4 Courts in jurisdictions with statutes substantially similar to New Jersey's have ruled that a witness may sign a
will within a reasonable period of time after the testator's execution.' 0 5 These courts, however, have consistently refused to allow a witness to sign after a testator's death, reasoning that to do
so would "erode the efficacy of the witnessing requirement as a
97 Id. at 485, 487 A.2d at 778.

at 485-86, 487 A.2d at 778.
99 For the text of the comment to § 2-502 see supra note 91.
100 Cunningham, 198 N.J. Super. at 489, 487 A.2d at 780.
101 Id. at 486, 487 A.2d at 778. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2 (West 1983) which
requires that the witness either observe the testator sign the will or acknowledge
that the signature is his. Id. In Cunningham, the second witness observed neither of
these acts. Cunningham, 198 N.J. Super. at 487, 487 A.2d at 778-79.
102 Id., 487 A.2d at 778.
103 For the text of § 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code see supra note 91.
104 See In re Estate of Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987); In re Estate of
Flicker, 215 Neb. 495, 339 N.W.2d 914 (1983); In re Estate of Mikeska, 140 Mich.
App: 116, 362 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); In re Leo's Will, 12 Fla. Supp. 61
(Dade County Ct. 1958).
105 See Flicker, 215 Neb. at 496, 339 N.W.2d at 915; Mikeska, 140 Mich. App. at
121, 362 N.W.2d at 910.
98 Id.
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safeguard against fraud or mistake."' 0 6
Although the statutory requirements necessary to execute a
will in NewJersey have changed over the course of time, the level
of scrutiny applied in interpreting the various statutes has generally remained constant. 10 7 In In re Estate of Peters,'0 8 the New
Jersey Supreme Court examined the requirements of the New
Jersey statute and declared that it may be reasonable, under certain circumstances, for a witness to sign a will after the testator's
death. 0' 9
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, began the
opinion in Peters by citing a brief history of the development of
the Wills Act." 0 The justice pointed out that wills are "creatures
of positive law" "' and that the failure of a will to comply with the
statute has traditionally resulted in the instrument being declared
invalid regardless of testamentary intent." 2 The court observed
that such inequitable results have often led to the circumvention
of the Wills Act through various means." 3 Although the court
posited that the Uniform Probate Code was promulgated in recognition of the need to prevent inequities and to restore the priority of the will as a "means of devising property after death," it
noted that the Code did not intend that the strict construction of
the statutory formalities be abandoned." 4 Observing that the
Code reduced the number and refined the scope of formalities,
the court stated that fewer inequities would result under the
Code despite a strict construction and that such cases "would be
justified by the importance of the interests protected by the formal requirements that were retained.""'
The court further observed that the substantial compliance
doctrine, which relaxes the extent to which the statutory formalities must be honored, is a second approach to Wills Act reId.
See supra note 61.
108 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987).
109 Id. at 278, 526 A.2d at 1013.
110 Id. at 270-71, 526 A.2d at 1008-09.
I1I Id. at 271, 526 A.2d at 1008. For an in-depth discussion of the development
of the Wills Act see Nelson & Starck, supra note 2, at 331.
112 Peters, 107 N.J. at,270, 526 A.2d at 1008.
113 Id., 526 A.2d at 1008-09. The court cited conveyances in joint tenancy, revocable trusts, tentative trusts, and cash value life insurance policies as examples of
previous attempts to circumvent the act. Id., 526 A.2d at 1009.
114 Id. at 271, 526 A.2d at 1009.
106

107

115

Id.
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form." 6 The court noted that the doctrine does not
automatically void a will upon the finding of a formal defect, but
rather probes to determine whether there was testamentary intent and whether the will sufficiently conforms with the statutory
formalities.1 7 The court realized that while both approaches address the same ills, they each endorse different remedies." '8
Recognizing that the prior statute "was rife with the formal
encrustations that had inspired the proposals for reform,"'l9 the
court stated that the legislature responded by enacting the Probate Reform Act of 1978.120 Additionally, the court suggested
2
that the present statute governing the execution of wills,1 1
modeled after the Uniform Probate Code, significantly reduced
22
the number of formalities entailed in the execution of a will. 1
The court also noted that the requirements associated with witnessing a will have been reduced to minimize the difficulty of
1 3
complying with the prescribed witness formalities. 2
In an attempt to have the will admitted to probate, Joseph
Skrok argued that it was the intent of the legislature to allow a
witness to sign a will at any time after the testator signed or acknowledged his signature, because the present statute eliminated
the formality that both witnesses sign in the testator's presence. 124 Accordingly, the court considered the argument that the
instrument was executed "within the contemplation of the statute" and in the alternative, that the will was valid because it sub116

Id. at 271-72, 526 A.2d at 1009 (citing Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the

Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975)).
'17 Id. at 271, 526 A.2d at 1009 (citing Langbein, Subsiantial Compliance With the
Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975)).
118 Id. at 271, 526 A.2d at 1009.
119 Id. at 272, 526 A.2d at 1009. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-2 (repealed 1983)
which states:
Except as provided in [the section governing holographic wills], a will to
be valid shall be in writing and signed by the testator, which signature
shall be made by the testator, or the making thereof acknowledged by
him, and such writing declared to be his last will, in the presence of 2
witnesses present at the same time, who shall subscribe their names
thereto, as witnesses, in the presence of the testator.
Id.
120 Peters, 107 N.J. at 272, 526 A.2d at 1010. See Foreword to N.J. STAT. ANN.
Title 3B which is a comprehensive revision of Title 3:A and is based on the Uniform
Probate Code.
121 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-2 (West 1983).
122 Peters, 107 N.J. at 272, 526 A.2d at 1010.
123 Id. at 272-73, 526 A.2d at 1010. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
124 Peters, 107 N.J. at 273, 526 A.2d at 1010.
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stantially complied with the statute. 125
Addressing the first argument, Justice Handler noted that
the legislature did not dispense with the formality of witnessing
the execution of a will. 126 The court determined that because the
number offormalities have been reduced, "scrupulous adherence" to those which remain has become of greater importance. 127 Acknowledging that witnesses generally serve both an
observatory 128 and signatory 1 29 function, the court noted that the
present statute promulgated by the legislature clearly requires
that both functions be fulfilled. 130 Consequently, the court deter13 1
mined that a witness's signature is necessary.
Noting that witnesses' signatures would "lose probative
worth and tend to fail" the evidentiary purpose 32 if witnesses
"were permitted to sign at a time remote from their required observations as witnesses," the court posited that both acts should
occur contemporaneously or within close succession of one another. 1 33 Accordingly, the court concluded that the statute implies that a witness may subscribe a will within a reasonable time
after its execution. 134
To further support its position, the court noted that the legislature clearly dictated that the witness must actually observe the
testator's acknowledgement of his signature or signing of the
will. 1 35 Stating that the witnessing function "constitutes a part of
the formal ceremony entailed in the will's proper execution," regardless of whether or not a will is "self-proving," the court
again implied that the witness's signing must occur within a reaId.
Id. at 274, 526 A.2d at 1010.
127 Id.
128 Id. The observatory function embodies the witness's "direct and purposeful
observation" of the testator's subscription or acknowledgement of the will. Id. at
274, 526 A.2d at 1011.
129 Id. The signatory function encompasses the witnesses' affixing of their signatures to the will. Id. The court deemed the signature requirement as an essential
"element of the witnessing requirement." Id. at 274-75, 526 A.2d at 1010. It
serves both the evidentiary and probative aspects because it clarifies the observation requirement. Id. at 275, 526 A.2d at 1010.
130 Id. at 275, 526 A.2d at 1010.
131 Id., 526 A.2d at 1011.
132 Id. See also Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 3, at 6-9; Langbein, supra note 5, at
492-95.
133 Peters, 107 N.J. at 275, 526 A.2d at 1011.
134 Id. The court explicitly stated that, "[w]e are thus satisfied that it would be
unreasonable to construe the statute as placing no time limit on the requirement of
obtaining two witnesses' signatures." Id.
135 Id.
125
126
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sonable period of time from the testator's signing or acknowledgement of the will.' 36 Moreover, the court reasoned that
because execution formalities serve to prevent undue influence
and fraud, they are substantive requirements.1 7 Therefore, the
3 8
court determined that any defect in execution is substantive.
Consequently, the court interpreted the legislature's reduction of
the number of execution formalities under the present statute as
not suggesting a diminution in the significance of those that remained. 3 9 On the contrary, the court determined that their significance should be heightened to prevent perjury and mistake
and "to forestall frauds by the living upon the dead."' 4
In response to the trial court's proclamation of equitable
powers, Justice Handler analyzed the equitable principles underlying the statute and noted that when no ambiguity exists on the
face of a statute, courts must enforce the statute as written.' 4' In
conclusion, the court agreed with the appellate division's ruling
which noted that although the present statute reduced the
number and refined the scope of formalities required, the "continued prophylactic purpose to prevent fraud" suggests that the
remaining formalities may not be neglected on equitable
grounds. 142
Having concluded that a witness must sign a will within a
reasonable period of time, the court then considered whether it
is reasonable to permit a witness to affix his signature to a will
eighteen months after he has witnessed the signing or acknowledgement of the will by the testator and after the death of the
testator. 4 3 Although other jurisdictions have formulated a
136

Id. at 276, 526 A.2d at 1011.

137 Id.
138 Id.

(citing Watkins v. Watkins, 82 N.J. Eq. 483, 89 A.2d 253 (Ch. Div. 1913)).
But see In re Estate of Saenger, 133 N.J. Super. 151, 335 A.2d 601 (Law Div. 1975)
(proving deceased witness's signature on will with a perfect attestation clause is not
substantive issue).
139 Peters, 107 N.J. at 276, 526 A. 2d at 1011-12.
140 Id. (quoting Murray v. Lewis, 94 N.J. Eq. 681, 121 A. 525 (Ch. Div. 1923)).
The court analogized that the purpose for the required formalities under the present statute is no different than under the prior statute. Id. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 28
N.J. Super. 220, 100 A.2d 346 (App. Div. 1953) (execution requirements forestall
fraud upon the dead by the living); Murray v. Lewis, 94 N.J. Eq. 681, 121 A. 525
(Ch. Div. 1923) (principles of equity may not cure a defect in execution).
141 See Peters, 107 N.J. at 277, 526 A.2d at 1012.
142 Id. (citing In re Estate of Peters, 210 N.J. Super. 295, 306, 509 A.2d 791, 803
(App. Div. 1986), affd, 107 NJ. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987)).
143 Id. at 277-78, 526 A.2d at i012.
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bright line test concerning this issue, 144 the court endorsed the
position adopted by the appellate division, reasoning that there
may be circumstances under which a witness's signing of a will
after the testator's death would be reasonable." 4 5 The court
noted, however, that such situations were not present in this case
because there was no plausible explanation for the failure to obtain the witnesses' signatures during the fifteen month interval
prior to the testator's death."' 6 The court stated that the signing
must occur within a reasonable period of time after observation
of the testator's signing or acknowledgment in order to prevent
the witness from attesting to what was vaguely remembered
rather than that what was actually observed. 47 Although the
court noted that the requirement did not mandate subscription
prior to the death of the testator, it determined that the lengthy
delay in the present case was not reasonably within the contemplation of the statute."' 8
Addressing the alternative argument that the proffered will
should be admitted to probate because it was executed in substantial compliance with the statute, the court proceeded to discuss the manner in which it should interpret wills which do not
satisfy the minimal formalities of the statute."19 The court observed that the substantial compliance doctrine permits beneficiaries of a will not meeting all formal requirements to prove that
the testator executed the will with finality and that adequate evidence exists to that effect notwithstanding the defect. 50 The
court noted, however, that this doctrine reduces the predictability of wills and has drawn criticism for lack of formality.'-" The
court further observed that wills are unlike business contracts in
that they often necessitate informality and are usually not made
under time constraints, thus giving the testator ample opportu144 See, e.g., In re Estate of Flicker, 215 Neb. 495, 339 N.W.2d 914 (1983); In re
Estate of Mikeska, 140 Mich. App. 116, 362 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
145 Peters, 107 N.J. at 278, 526 A.2d at 1013.
146 Id. at 278-79, 526 A.2d at 1013. The court determined that the emotional
trauma of the situation which allegedly precluded the witnesses from affixing their
signatures to the will during execution dissipated soon after the execution and is
not an adequate explanation for the failure to subscribe soon thereafter. Id.
147 Id. at 279, 526 A.2d at 1013. But see Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N.J. Eq. 290
(Prerog. Ct. 1858) (holding that will with perfect attestation clause ought not be
voided on account of witnesses mere want of recollection).
148 Peters, 107 N.J. at 277-78, 526 A.2d at 1012-13.
149 Id. at 279, 526 A.2d at 1013.
150 Id. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 521.
151 Peters, 107 N.J. at 279-80, 526 A.2d at 1013.
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nity to meet all formal requirements. 52
Justice Handler approved of the appellate division's rejection of the rule of substantial compliance and added that
although a literal construction of the statute may prove to be unjust in particular cases, courts are not at liberty to change the
requirements expressed by the legislature.' 5 3 The court commented that in light of the legislature's liberalization of execution
formalities, it was unwilling to further relax the minimal formalities which remained because it would "effectively vitiate the statutory requirement that a witness sign the will."' 54 Accordingly,
the court upheld the general proposition that strict adherence to
statutory formalities is required to validate a will regardless of
55
the absence of fraud.
The court further reasoned that because wills are creatures
of statutory law and the purpose of the formal requirements is to
prevent fraud upon the deceased's estate, the failure of a testator
to comply with the statute shall void his intention to devise his
property by will. 156 Such voiding occurs because it is not certain
that the testator has a complete and definite intention to pass his
property. 5 7 The court recognized that a departure from the
strict interpretation of statutory formalities in a particular instance would not be justified because the relaxation of any material formality would create an opportunity for fraud, substitution
and imposition. 5 1 Consequently, the court determined that to
adopt the substantial compliance doctrine in this case "would unsettle the probate process and undermine the reform enacted by
the [l]egislature."' 5 9
Although the Peters court declined to adopt the substantial
compliance doctrine in this case, it did not hold that such doctrine would be inapplicable under all circumstances. 60 The
152 Id. at 280, 526 A.2d at 1013 (quoting Nelson & Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331, 355 (1979)).
153 Id. at 280-81, 526 A.2d at 1014.
154 Id. at 281, 526 A.2d at 1014. However, in a footnote to the opinion, the court
did not foreclose consideration of the doctrine of substantial compliance in cases
where there is no indication of fraud and there has been an attempt to comply with
the statute. Id. at n.4.
155 Id. at 281-82, 526 A.2d at 1014.
156 Id. at 282, 526 A.2d at 1015.
157 Id.
158 Id. (quoting Succession of Roussel, 373 So.2d 155, 157 (La. 1979)).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 281, 526 A.2d at 1014 n.4. The court stated:
We are unwilling to foreclose consideration of the substantial compliance doctrine in a case where there is no question of fraud, and where,
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court made a broad reference to circumstances under which substantial compliance may be acceptable; however, it refrained
from further describing such circumstances in detail.' 6 ' The acts
of execution surrounding the Peters case undeniably demonstrated the testator's intent to create a will.' 62 The court, however, explicitly determined that there was no "clear attempt to
comply with the statutory formality" because the statute requires
witnessing by at least two persons and the notary's signature may
not suffice in the absence of a second witness's signature.

63

It is

difficult to conceive of circumstances which more clearly demonstrate an attempt to comply with the statute. 164 In light of the
interpretation applied in Peters, it is apparent that courts will
strictly construe all factual situations, thereby effectively eliminat6 5
ing the viability of the substantial compliance doctrine.1
Because the number of formalities to properly execute a will
have been reduced, 166 there is little need for substantial compliance when testators seek the assistance of competent legal coununlike this case, there has been a clear attempt to comply with a statutory formality but compliance is deficient. In this case, however, the
statutory formalities contemplate at a minimum witnessing by two persons; the treatment of a notary's signature as that of a witness does not
compensate for the absence of the signature of a second witness.
Id. (emphasis in original).
161 See id.
162 Two people were summoned for the express purpose of witnessing a will.
Five people performed the observatory function of the statute and one person may
be considered to have performed the signatory function. Moreover, there were no
allegations of fraud. The only missing requirement was the signatory function of a
second witness. Additionally, witnesses performing the observatory function were
available to testify to the acts concerning the execution. See id. at 265-69, 526 A.2d
1006-08.
163 Id. at 281, 526 A.2d at 1014 n.4.
164 In Peters, a ceremony was held for the purpose of executing the will. Id. at
266-68, 526 A.2d 1006-07. The testator listened while the provisions of the will
were read, acknowledged that he understood them, and signed the instrument in
the presence of a notary public and his wife. Id. Upon the arrival of two persons
who were dispatched for the purpose of witnessing the will, the testator again assented to the provisions of the will and acknowledged his signature. Id. The two
intended witnesses would not have been present except to witness the will. See id.
165 Discussing whether a will which substantially complies with a wills act should
be admitted to probate, Professors Dukeminier and Johanson commented:
The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on the Making of Revocation of Wills 34-56 (1981), discusses the problems that
might arise under a substantial compliance doctrine and concludes that
the court should not be authorized to dispense with the writing or signature requirements but should be authorized to dispense with the witness
requirement.
J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 193 (1984).
166 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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sel in executing a will. 16 7 In this regard, courts should not even
consider substantial compliance when the purposes of the statutory formalities' 68 are weighed against the harm which may result
in the few instances in which a lawyer supervised will fails to comply with the statute. The substantial compliance doctrine, however, still deserves consideration because the majority of wills
failing to 69comply with the statute are not prepared by
attorneys. 1
Presented with a non-complying will prepared by a layperson, the Peters court considered the substantial compliance doctrine. The court observed that substantial compliance has been
17
sharply criticized because it reduces the predictability of wills. 1
Combining that criticism with the finding that there was no attempt to comply with the statute since the witnesses failed to sign
the will within a "reasonable time,"' 17 1 the Peters court correctly
167 See Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A. J.
1192 (1979) stating:
[The] formal [execution] requirements are not difficult to comply with,
and one of the basic responsibilities of conscientious lawyer-draftsmen
is to supervise execution ceremonies in order to ensure compliance. In
general, the bar discharges this responsibility well, so that execution
blunders rarely happen in the lawyer-served end of the estate planning
spectrum.
Id.
168 See In re Hale's Will, 21 N.J. 284, 296-98, 121 A.2d 511, 518-19(1956).
169 It is not suggested that different levels of scrutiny should be applied to lawyer
prepared wills and homedrawn wills; however, homedrawn wills prepared by
laypersons "ignorant of the existence of true import of statutory requirements have
left behind them a staggering legacy of noncomplying instruments." Langbein,
supra note 167, at 1192-93.
170 Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 279-80, 526 A.2d 1005, 1013. Justice Handler
commented:
The argument in favor of the implementation of the substantial
compliance doctrine is that, while it lacks the predictability of the
U.P.C., it does insist upon a higher degree of formality yet with the understanding that where the failure to comply with any formality is
shown, proof may be received to demonstrate that the function of the
formality has still been met.... The problem is that wills are unlike the
world of contract where the demands of business often necessitate infor-

mality ....

Wills are more often made without such demands of time

pressure. The testator has every opportunity to comply with formality
requirements.
A second problem is the ambiguity of "substantial compliance." ...
Does it mean that some formalities are more important than others and
that substantial compliance involves completion of only the important
formalities?
Id. (quoting Nelson & Stark, Formalitiesand Formalism: A CriticalLook at the Execution of
Wills, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331, 355 (1979)).
171 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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decided not to apply the doctrine. Thus, even if the court had
acknowledged that the testator had attempted to meet the statutory formalities, it would nonetheless have been correct in declin72
ing to apply the substantial compliance doctrine.
By noting in a cursory fashion that substantial compliance
may be appropriate in certain instances, the Peters court has unfortunately created a loophole which will produce further litigation. The court could have correctly applied prior case law which
required a strict application of the Wills Act in all situations.
Although one foreign jurisdiction has found it appropriate to allow substantial compliance with the Wills Act,' 73 such application
is not mandadted in New Jersey.174 By modeling the current
Wills Act after the Uniform Probate Code, the legislature has attempted to eliminate the "formal encrustations" that have prevented wills from being admitted to probate in the past.
Consequently, it is unnecessary for the judiciary to dispense with
the remaining formalities in an attempt to further the legislative
172 In reforming the Wills Act the legislature reduced the number of formalities
necessary to validly execute a will; however those formalities retained "have assumed even greater importance, and demand at least the degree of scrupulous adherence required under the former statute." Peters, 107 N.J. at 274, 526 A.2d at
1010. There has traditionally been strict scrutiny of the Wills Act. The Ordinary,
in In re Gertrude Rice McElwaine, posited:
I have no doubt that this paper was intended by the testatrix as her will,
and that but for the statute, it ought to have effect to it so far as she had
legal power to make a will. But if one safeguard provided by statute is
dispensed with, another may be, and if I do so in this case, where the
construction is clear, I may as well dispense with the requirement of
writing, or of two witnesses. The danger is of frittering away the statute
to avoid its effect when it works injustice.
In re Gertrude Rice McElwaine, 18 N.J. Eq. 499, 504 (Prerog. Ct. 1867).
173 South Australia has amended the Wills Act to include the following provision:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person shall, notwithstanding that it has not been executed with
the formalities required by this Act, be deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the Supreme Court, upon application for admission of
the document to probate as the last will of the deceased, is satisfied that
there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his will.
S. AUSTL. WILLs ACT 1936-75 § 12(2).
174 The South Australian Wills Act 1936-75 contains many of the "formal encrustations" that the New Jersey Wills Act contained prior to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. Professor Palk commented that the 28th Report of the South
Australian Law Reform Committee to the Attorney-General, which stated that there
are a number of cases where wills are defective for failure of the testator to sign at
the foot of the will or for the failure of the witnesses to sign in the presence of each
other, prompted the above amendment to the statute. Palk, Informal Wills: From
Soldiers to Citizens, 5 ADEL. L. REV. 382, 384-85 (1976).
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intent at the expense of the statute's protective features. 75
The Peters decision also established that a witness may sign a
will after a testator's death under certain circumstances. 7 6 The
court again left open for future consideration the issue of what
actually constitutes appropriate circumstances, because the witnesses' failure to subscribe the will had been inadequately explained. 7 7 Reference was made, however, to a situation where
the testator died moments after the execution. 71 Should trial
courts further embark on this course of reasoning, testamentary
dispositions not meeting the requisite formalities79will be prone to
the injustices that the statute seeks to prevent.1
Considering the purposes of the statutory formalities, perhaps a better and safer rule is to require a literal construction of
the statute with regard to the witnessing requirement and to accept nothing short of positive proof of conformity with the statute.'8 0 By allowing a witness to subscribe a will after the
testator's death, the testator has no "opportunity to cry out"
against an unintended disposition and the possibility of "forestall[ing] fraud upon the dead by the living" is diminished.'"'
The deceased testator has no means by which he can prevent the
fraudulent distribution of his estate.
Applying a "bright line" test as other jurisdictions have done
175 Professor Langbein argues that the literal compliance rule is a judicial creation that can be abandoned "when experience and reflection reveal that its harsh
results are not essential to the good order of the probate system." Langbein, supra
note 167, at 1195. One commentator argues that the impact of the Uniform Probate
Code has been to diminish the formality which has long been the hallmark of the
law of wills. In support of her position, she states:
The bare-bones formalities that remain for a valid witnessed will are
those that most laymen would associate with a will: it must be in writing,
... signed.... and [witnessed by two persons]. Gone are the arcane and
less familiar formalities such as publication and presence; gone also are
the more technical requirements which mandate a signature "at the
end," or the witnessing of a particular aspect of execution, such as the
testator's signature. The simple, straightforward, and demystified procedure of the UPC makes it possible, if not probable, for a layman to
preside at the execution of his own will without running the grave risks
of invalidity.
Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic Anomaly, 67 Ky. L.J. 39,
330-31 (1978-79).
176 Peters, 107 N.J. at 278, 526 A.2d at 1013.
177 Id. at 278-79, 526 A.2d at 1013.
178 Id. See In re Leo's Will, 12 Fla. Supp. 61 (Dade County Ct. 1958) (testator died
immediately after signing will but before witnesses were able to sign).
179 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
180 See Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N.J. Eq. 597, 600 (1883).
181 See In re Hale's Will, 21 N.J. 284, 297, 121 A.2d 511, 518-19 (1956).
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would more effectively protect the "efficacy of the witnessing requirement as a safeguard against fraud or mistake.'

2

Addition-

ally, it would eliminate the possibility of confusion as to what
circumstances should exist before a witness may sign a will after a
testator's death. The legislature has reduced the number and refined the scope of statutory formalities to prevent inequity on behalf of a decedent's estate for execution defects. When courts
allow a witness to subscribe after a testator's death, they expand
the manner in which the execution of a will may fit within the
statutory formality prescribed by the legislature and more readily
enable proponents to circumvent the obvious protective features
of the statute.
Douglas M. D'Alessandro
182

In re Estate of Flicker, 215 Neb. 495, 496, 339 N.W.2d 914, 915 (1983).

